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Preface & Acknowledgements 
Welcome to our Ninth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium! This event is the 
highlight of the year for the Acquisition Research Program (ARP) here at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) because it showcases the findings of recently completed 
research projects—and that research activity has been prolific! Since the ARP’s founding in 
2003, over 800 original research reports have been added to the acquisition body of 
knowledge. We continue to add to that library, located online at 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, at a rate of roughly 140 reports per year. This activity has 
engaged researchers at over 60 universities and other institutions, greatly enhancing the 
diversity of thought brought to bear on the business activities of the DoD.  
We generate this level of activity in three ways. First, we solicit research topics from 
academia and other institutions through an annual Broad Agency Announcement, 
sponsored by the USD(AT&L). Second, we issue an annual internal call for proposals to 
seek NPS faculty research supporting the interests of our program sponsors. Finally, we 
serve as a “broker” to market specific research topics identified by our sponsors to NPS 
graduate students. This three-pronged approach provides for a rich and broad diversity of 
scholarly rigor mixed with a good blend of practitioner experience in the field of acquisition. 
We are grateful to those of you who have contributed to our research program in the past 
and hope this symposium will spark even more participation. 
We encourage you to be active participants at the symposium. Indeed, active 
participation has been the hallmark of previous symposia. We purposely limit attendance to 
350 people to encourage just that. In addition, this forum is unique in its effort to bring 
scholars and practitioners together around acquisition research that is both relevant in 
application and rigorous in method. Seldom will you get the opportunity to interact with so 
many top DoD acquisition officials and acquisition researchers. We encourage dialogue both 
in the formal panel sessions and in the many opportunities we make available at meals, 
breaks, and the day-ending socials. Many of our researchers use these occasions to 
establish new teaming arrangements for future research work. In the words of one senior 
government official, “I would not miss this symposium for the world as it is the best forum 
I’ve found for catching up on acquisition issues and learning from the great presenters.” 
We expect affordability to be a major focus at this year’s event. It is a central tenet of 
the DoD’s Better Buying Power initiatives, and budget projections indicate it will continue to 
be important as the nation works its way out of the recession. This suggests that research 
with a focus on affordability will be of great interest to the DoD leadership in the year to 
come. Whether you’re a practitioner or scholar, we invite you to participate in that research. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the ARP:  
 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics) 
 Director, Acquisition Career Management, ASN (RD&A) 
 Program Executive Officer, SHIPS 
 Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
 Program Executive Officer, Integrated Warfare Systems 
 Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
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 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & 
Technology) 
 Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, U.S. Army 
 Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, Department 
of Energy 
 Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development, Test & 
Evaluation 
 Program Executive Officer, Tactical Aircraft  
 Director, Office of Small Business Programs, Department of the Navy 
 Director, Office of Acquisition Resources and Analysis (ARA) 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Acquisition & Procurement 
 Director of Open Architecture, DASN (RDT&E) 
 Program Executive Officer, Littoral Combat Ships 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this symposium. 
James B. Greene Jr. Keith F. Snider, PhD 
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.) Associate Professor 
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Mark Kryzsko—Mr. Krzysko serves as the deputy director of the Enterprise Information and Office of 
the Secretary of Defense Studies. In this senior leadership position, he oversees Federally Funded 
Research and Development Centers and directs data governance, technical transformation, and 
shared services efforts to make timely, authoritative acquisition information available to support 
oversight of the Department of Defense’s major programs—a portfolio totaling more than $1.6 trillion 
of investment funds over the life cycle of the programs.  
Preceding his current position, Mr. Krzysko served as ADUSD for business transformation, 
providing strategic guidance for re-engineering the Department’s business system investment 
decision-making processes. He also served as ADUSD for strategic sourcing & acquisition processes 
and as director of the Supply Chain Systems Transformation Directorate, championing and facilitating 
innovative uses of information technologies to improve and streamline the supply chain process for 
the Department of Defense. As the focal point for supply chain systems, he was responsible for 
transformation, implementation, and oversight of enterprise capabilities for the acquisition, logistics, 
and procurement communities. In addition, Mr. Krzysko served as advisor to the deputy under 
secretary of defense for business transformation on supply chain matters and as the functional 
process proponent to the Department’s business transformation efforts, resulting in the establishment 
of the Business Transformation Agency.  
In March 2002, Mr. Krzysko joined the Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy office as 
deputy director of e-business. As the focal point for the acquisition domain, he was responsible for 
oversight and transformation of the acquisition community into a strategic business enterprise. This 
included driving the adoption of e-business practices across the Department, leading the move to 
modernize processes and systems, and managing the investment review process and portfolio of 
business systems. Mr. Krzysko served as the division director of Electronic Commerce Solutions for 
the Naval Air Systems Command from June 2000 to March 2002. From April 1991 until March 2000, 
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Mr. Krzysko served in various senior-level acquisition positions at the Naval Air Systems Command, 
including contracting officer of F/A-18 foreign military sales, F/A-18 developmental programs, and the 
F-14. In addition, he served as program manager of Partnering, the Acquisition Business Process Re-
engineering Effort, and as acquisition program manager for the Program Executive Office for Tactical 
Aircraft.  
Mr. Krzysko began his career in the private sector in various executive and managerial positions, 
including assistant managing director for Lord & Taylor Department Stores and operations 
administrator for Woodward & Lothrop Department Stores. Mr. Krzysko holds a Bachelor of Science 
degree in finance from the University of Maryland University College, College Park, MD, and a Master 
of General Administration degree in financial management from the same institution. 
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Abstract 
The complex interdependencies between systems organized for a system-of-systems (SoS) 
capability pose a challenge to effective acquisition management of SoS assets. In general, 
methodologies to assess risk that cascades through interdependencies are critical to 
effectively analyzing alternatives in a capability-based acquisition strategy. A particular 
problem occurs in cases where requirements on systems are evolving. In this paper, a 
Bayesian Network (BN) method is presented, which models requirement evolution in the 
midst of system interdependencies. The method analyzes the cascading effects of 
requirement and systems interdependencies on risk. A primary output of the approach is the 
identification of both critical systems and requirements. A synthetic problem is solved to 
demonstrate the proposed method. 
Introduction 
Acquisition management continues to struggle with complex dependencies between 
systems in both technical and programmatic dimensions in the face of requirements that 
evolve during the development process. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
studies have identified the evolution of requirements as a source of program cost and 
schedule overruns (Sullivan, 2011). Therefore, an adequate assessment of the cascading 
effects of risk among interdependent systems in the presence of evolving requirements has 
the potential to reduce cost and schedule overruns. The research in this paper aims to 
provide a methodology that supports pre- and post-milestone B activities by analyzing the 
impact of requirement changes and system development failures during the generation of a 
system-of-systems capability. 
According to Maier (1998), a system-of-systems (SoS) refers to a collection of 
geographically distributed, heterogeneous, collaborative systems that demonstrate 
operational and managerial independences. The collaboration can be represented via 
networks that define interactions required to achieve a unique capability. Further, in a 
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capability-based acquisition setting, requirements are expressed in terms of capabilities, and 
interdependencies between requirements add another dimension of complexity to system 
development. Complexity is further aggravated by the many stakeholders who influence 
requirements and may even have conflicting requirements for the same SoS. An example of 
this is the development of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), or F-35, which continues to face 
schedule and cost overruns (Wilson, 2011), partially due to a development climate that 
includes three different services and many potential international buyers, each of which has 
differing requirements and requirement hierarchies. Documented case studies in the 
development of computer-based systems have shown that requirement interdependencies 
are real and that they tend to evolve over time (Anderson & Felici, 2001).  
Interdependent systems are directly and indirectly impacted by the associated 
networks of interdependent requirements, resulting in hierarchical networks. Figure 1 is a 
simplified adaptation from current literature on SoS artifacts and their employment in the 
engineering of SoS capability architectures using a wave model structure (Lane, Dahmann, 
Rebovich, & Lowry, 2012). The model is adapted here to include hierarchy and time scale 
that range from the broad, overarching objectives that are strategic in nature (γ-level) to the 
tactical aspects of individual system (and subsystem) acquisition (α-level). This paper 
focuses on interdependency analysis (i.e., α-level process in Figure 1) with requirement 
evolution from above (perhaps due to shifts in portfolio management) occurring during the 
development process. 
 
Figure 1. System–of-Systems Acquisition Hierarchy 
Research reported in this paper follows from methods and tools targeting improved 
decision-support for SoS capabilities developed under prior grants sponsored by the NPS 
Acquisition Research Program and reported in papers at the 2008 (Ghose & DeLaurentis, 
2008), 2009 (Mane & DeLarentis, 2009a), 2010 (Mane & DeLaurentis, 2010), and 2011 
(Mane & DeLaurentis, 2011) NPS Acquisition Research Symposiums. Research conducted 
during the first year centered on the computational exploratory model (CEM) based on the 
16 basic technical management and technical system-engineering processes outlined in the 
Systems Engineering Guide for System-of-Systems (SoS-SE) (Department of Defense 
[DoD], 2008) and Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DoD, 2012). Research efforts during the 
second year entered on improvements to allow for modeling of scenarios that illustrate the 
underlying dynamics that produce schedule delays and, ultimately, cost overruns. The third 
year of research focused on the addition of system development-risk detail that enables the 
analysis of the impact of system maturity on the development process when the higher-
order effects of interdependencies are captured. The fourth year of research added a 
capability module based on Markov analysis to the CEM that aggregate the network 
interdependency characteristics and compare alternatives with respect to the time required 
to arrest the propagation of development delays in a network. The current research is 
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between systems and possibly evolving requirements. The rationale is that such analysis 
can reduce risk to program success. 
A Bayesian Network (BN) is used to represent interdependencies between systems 
and between requirements in an SoS capability development context. BNs are explored due 
to their strength in representing causal relationships between systems involving uncertainty. 
Uncertainty is addressed in a BN using a continuous density distribution, allowing an 
increase in the robustness of model outcomes. The BN is exercised on a synthetic problem 
to compute time impacts due to both requirements evolution and the impact of 
interdependencies between component systems.  
The Analytical Approach 
A Hierarchical Network Representation of System-of-Systems 
To achieve a wide range of objectives, each system operates independently, but 
each must also interact effectively with other systems to meet the specified SoS capability. 
Thus, it is necessary to understand the interdependencies between component systems to 
obtain high confidence in achieving capability levels. As mentioned, components in an SoS 
assemble in networks and present interdependencies within a level and between levels in a 
hierarchy. Figure 2 shows the multi-level network in more detail that includes three levels: 
capability, requirements, and systems levels (Mane & DeLaurentis, 2011). At the 
requirement level, each node represents a requirement, while each link represents the 
interdependency between requirements. Likewise, at the system level, each node 
represents a system, and each link represents the interdependency between systems 
(Mane & DeLaurentis, 2009b). Interdependent systems are grouped to fulfill a requirement, 
while interdependent requirements are expected to achieve a capability. The 
interdependencies contribute to increasing capability but also may lead to failure through 
concealed risks (Mane & DeLaurentis, 2011). Hence, evaluating the impact of 
interdependencies is a critical task. 
 
Figure 2. Hierarchical Multi-Level Representation of a System-of-Systems 
Capability 
An Interdependency Analysis of System-of-Systems Using a Bayesian Network 
In this paper, a BN is adopted to analyze uncertain interdependencies between 
systems. The BN can graphically represent interactions among multiple components and 
provide the basic structure for analyzing and visualizing the capacity-based acquisition 
model. The BN is a probabilistic tool that evaluates networks of systems with respect to 
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critical components from a risk perspective while considering requirement revolution, but 
also it can determine component requirement flexibilities given expected development time 
of the SoS capability.  
A Bayesian Network 
A BN is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) whose nodes are the random variables and 
whose edges directly influence one another. Local probabilities represent the nature of the 
dependence of each variable (node) on its parents. Probability information in a BN model is 
defined through these local distributions. A node with no parent node in the BN model 
denotes a random variable and its associated probability distribution. A node with its parent 
node(s) can be represented as a conditional probability distribution (CPD).  
Uncertainty with Beta Distribution 
Probability information in a BN is collected through experiment tests, measured data, 
or expert opinions. Many errors can occur in developing this information. It is important to 
account for uncertainty in the model in order to generate reliable results. In this paper, which 
treats a synthetic proof-of-concept example, beta distributions are used for node probability 
information to address uncertainties. Beta distributions are a family of continuous probability 
distributions defined on the interval between 0 and 1 parameterized by two positive shape 
parameters (α and β). There are several reasons to use a beta distribution. First, a beta 
family is rich in shapes, allowing representation of various types of probability information 
(Reese, Johnson, Hama, & Wilson, 2005). Figure 3 presents various shapes of beta 
distributions according to two positive shape parameters. Second, when there is no 
available probability information, the beta family is the best choice for use in determining the 
most conservative probability information. 
 
Figure 3. Various Shapes of Beta Distributions 
Propagating System Failures Through Interdependencies 
There are two sources of system failure in an SoS context: heritage and propagating. 
If a system fails on its own, then it is called a heritage failure. However, if a system failure is 
caused by propagating effects from interdependent systems, it is then called a propagating 
failure. It is therefore important to fuse all failure information, heritage and propagated. 
Figure 4 shows a simple BN where the node Y has N parent nodes. This paper 
focuses on binomial failures for a node. For example, each node in the BN can only take 
either 0 or 1 to represent the status of the component, “failure” or “working,” respectively. 
This is a limiting factor of the approach that we revisit at the conclusion.  
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Figure 4. A Bayesian Network Representation 
Consider that each node has its own heritage failure rate defined by a beta 
distribution and that node Y has n parents, X1…Xn. A beta distribution is parameterized by 
two positive shape parameters, denoted by sn+1 and sn+nn+1. These two positive 
parameters are interpreted as the number of failures and survivors, respectively, when sn 
and nn are integers (Spring & Thompson, 1966). Let PA(Y) denote the set of the parents of 
the node Y (i.e.,{ X1…Xn }). According to the law of total probability, the propagating failure 




    
(1) 
where ))(0( kYPAYpCPDk  , k is all combination of parent node values. For 
example, if PA(Y) includes two parent nodes (X1 and X2), then }}1,1{},0,1{},1,0{},0,0{{k . 
Therefore, a node with two parent nodes has four CPDk values. CPDk values here indicate 
the dependency strength of a failure propagating to a dependent system. For instance, if 
node X1 (or X2) fails, then node Y has a 30% (or 20%) chance to fail by a propagating effect 
of the node X1 (or X2) failure. In this case, all CPDk values are determined:
3.0)0,10( 21  XXYp , 2.0)1,00( 21  XXYp , 0)0,00( 21  XXYp , and 
5.0)1,10( 21  XXYp . Analytical solution )0( Yp for the propagating failure rate of node 
Y is very likely to be non-parametric due to its complicated functional form. For 
computational convenience, we use the approach in reference (Thompson & Haynes, 1980; 
Liu, Li, & Kim, 2011) to approximate the propagating failure rate with a beta distribution 
having the same first two moments. Let beta(b,c) denote the beta distribution of the 
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The first moment of p(Y=0) is the mean: 






where j is the value for PAi(Y) in the set of k. For computational ease, Equation 3 can be 
further written as follows: 
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Now, node Y has two different beta distributions, one for heritage failure rate and one 
for propagating failure rates encapsulated in Equation 6. These two beta distributions are 
integrated to get the new failure rate distribution of node Y, including both failure 
information: heritage and propagating. This task can be easily completed using the same 
process for obtaining fusion of all propagating failure information mentioned above with 
different CPDs indicating 100% propagating effects. After applying these two fusion 
processes (the first is fusion of propagating effects from dependent systems for the 
propagating failure rate, and the second is fusion of both heritage and propagating failure 
rates for the new integrated failure rate) to all nodes in a network, we can obtain the beta 
distributions of the new failure rate information, including propagating effects for all nodes. 
This result can be used to determine the critical component indicating the vulnerable 
component and expected development time for a whole SoS. 
A Representation of Requirement Evolution with Technology Readiness Level 
Requirement evolution refers to changes that take place in a set of system 
requirements after the initial requirement analysis (Anderson & Felici, 2001). In the SoS 
capability context, requirement evolution seems inevitable. For instance, an initial 
performance goal for payload capacity of an aircraft is 250,000 lbs, while in the future, 
customers might ask for 300,000 lbs. Or decision-makers may decide to reduce the payload 
capacity to 200,000 lbs due to the considerable delay and cost. Along with requirements 
evolving, failure rates of components related to requirement evolution may change as well.  
Technology readiness levels (TRLs) are a systematic metric/measurement NASA 
invented that supports assessments of the maturity of a particular technology and the 
consistent comparison of maturity between different types of technology (Mankins, 1995). In 
other words, TRLs represent the current highest available technology level, which is also a 
time-dependent variable. Thus, both requirement evolution and TRLs can impact component 
system failure rates. Take the previous aircraft payload capacity for example. In the former 
case, although we require a higher requirement capability, if TRL is increasing, meaning that 
the technology has been continuously proven for an application, at the same time failure 
rates might decrease, keep the same, or still increase. Similarly, in the latter case, TRL may 
influence failure rates by reducing a certain amount of its value. Additionally, TRLs could 
effect requirement evolutions. For example, policy makers may consider technology 
readiness levels and current development state together to decide whether necessary to 
reduce requirement capability.  
The critical connection between requirement evolution, TRL, and component failure 
rates plays an essential part in the development of the SoS capability. In the synthetic 
problem presented in the Research Result section, we assume TRL to be constant for all 
component systems. Therefore, if a requirement evolves to a higher level, system failure 
rates always increase. 
Research Result: A Synthetic Demonstration Problem 
A simple synthetic problem is formulated and solved to demonstrate the proposed 
BN approach. Figure 5 shows the representation of a five-system network where, for 
example, the development of system 1, here denoted by S1, depends on the development of 
systems 2 and 4. This implies that information from one system development process 
affects the development of dependent systems. For system 1, information flows from system 
2 and system 4 to system 1 to fuse all information from dependent systems. The T values 
indicate the dependency strength and correspond to the conditional probability of a failure 
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propagating to a dependent system. For instance, if system 4 fails, then system 1 has a 
30% chance to fail by a propagating effect of the system 4 failure. The table in Figure 5 
summarizes heritage failure rates for all systems in terms of beta distributions, means, and 
standard deviations. 
 
Figure 5. A Five-System Development Network and Heritage Failure Rate 
Information 
Consider the information fusion of failure rates of systems 2 and 3 with system 5 
(see Figure 6). System 5 is connected to two dependent systems, 2 and 3, with 
interdependency strength of 0.1 and 0.25, respectively. Systems 2 and 3 have their own 
heritage failure rates, with beta distributions shown in Figure 6a. The propagating failure rate 
on system 5 is easily calculated through the proposed approach in this paper, based on the 
given information about heritage failure rates and conditional probability for propagating 
effects. In Figure 6, blue lines denote the heritage failure rate distributions for systems, and 
red lines denote the propagating failure rate on system 5, respectively. The green line in 
Figure 6b represents the integrated failure rate for system 5. The mean of the system 5 
integrated failure rate represents an increase of 0.07 over its heritage rate value due to the 
propagating effects from dependent system failures. Figure 7 shows the mean values of 
propagating effects for all systems. These values depend on the number of dependent 
systems and the failure rates of dependent systems. System 2 has the highest propagating 
effects, indicating strong dependencies with numerous other systems. It also has a higher 
probability to be disrupted by other system failures during the development process. 
Because it is hard to control this kind of failure, the design team for system 2 should 
















System 1 Beta (20, 80) 0.2 0.04
System 2 Beta (5, 95) 0.05 0.02
System 3 Beta (25, 75) 0.25 0.04
System 4 Beta (10, 90) 0.1 0.03
System5 Beta (30, 70) 0.3 0.05
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(a) Propagating failure rate    (b) Integrated failure rate 
Figure 6. Information Fusion of Failure Rates of Systems 2 and 3 with System 5 
 
Figure 7. Mean Values for Failure Rates Propagating to Systems 
The same synthetic problem is now considered with the requirement evolution 
modeled via modified heritage failure rates. The rationale is that, when a system’s 
requirements become more stringent in efforts to reach a new capability goal, an increase of 
heritage failure rate follows. The total expected development time is adopted to measure 
development time of an SoS capability. We assumed that the expected development time 
for each system is 1, indicating that if there is no failure, each system can be done in one 
time unit. Every system also has development delay time due to its failure rate, calculated as 
the product of failure rate and the expected development time. For instance, if a system’s 
failure rate is 0.6 and expected development time for the system is 1, then the design team 
of this system needs 1.6 more times than normal to complete it. Therefore, the total 
expected development time can be formulated as the follows: 
 
i
ii timetdevelopmenexpectedratefailuretimetdevelopmenexpectedTotal )1(  (7) 
We increase the heritage failure rate of each system, one at a time, from 0 to 0.5. 
The resulting expected time to develop the systems to meet the SoS capability in each case 
is shown in Figure 8. System 1 has the steepest slope, indicating that it is most critical in 
terms of impact on total expected development time. The total expected development time 
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for all systems evolves linearly, a result of the model assumption of constant interdependent 
strengths. 
 
Figure 8. Evolution of Total Expected Development With Respect to Failure Rate 
Increases 
However, if decision-makers knew how much requirement change could be tolerated 
within the budgeted total development time, then they could make more informed choices. In 
the present method, this is done using a system upgrade capacity diagram. Figure 9 shows 
the system upgrade capacity diagram for the synthetic problem. The total expected 
development time is set to a limit of 7, and the maximum increase of failure rate for each 
system is computed. System 4’s upgrade capacity is higher than others, meaning that it can 
be substituted with an alternative system, which has higher failure rates. However, system 1 
has the lowest upgrade capacity because it was the most critical system in the synthetic 
problem, according to Figure 8. 
 
Figure 9. System Upgrade Capacity for Requirement Evolutions 
Conclusion 
The development process of an SoS capability is often affected by risks from 
interdependencies between constituent systems and the requirement evolution during the 
development life cycle. This paper adopts a BN approach to analyze interdependencies by 
measuring component failure rates and total expected development time for a whole SoS. 
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rates being evaluated for individual systems. By the integration of these two failure rates, 
both currently expressed in beta distributions, a new failure rate distribution is achieved that 
more completely represents the true risk and more faithfully determines the critical 
components.  
A simple, synthetic five-system SoS problem demonstrates the proposed BN 
approach. Results illustrate that the integrated failure rate for individual systems increases 
due to the propagating effects of interdependencies. The comparison of integrated failure 
rates among all systems is useful in identifying the most critical system. Meanwhile, given a 
development time constraint, upgrade capacity for each system when requirements evolves 
were computed. 
 The specific BN formulation approach in this paper rests on two basic assumptions. 
First, the failure rates (selected based on TRL) are assumed constant. Second, the 
interdependency strengths between systems are assumed constant. Hence, future work will 
address the relaxation of the assumptions. More generally, two additional challenges must 
be addressed. First, a BN approach can use only 0 or 1 to represent two discrete states, like 
“working” or “failure”; thus, continuous variables, such as development percentage, cannot 
be expressed directly. The second challenge is the collection of input failure rates, which 
were simply generated arbitrarily in this paper. Such rates may be inferred from analyses of 
historical data on TRL levels as they related to eventual development success. 
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